Security.
Your privacy is enforced by the database, not promised in a policy.

Below the surface
The trust stack.
Seven layers, each with one job and what would go wrong without it. Isolation, provenance and payments are built, and so is consent for what you enter by hand. The rest is designed, being built, and marked.
01
Isolation
Built. Your record is private because the database refuses every other member.
A least-privilege role
Member requests run as a database role that can reach only what a member needs. Tables that hold sessions, payment events, settings and the staff queue refuse it outright.
Without it: one mistaken query could read any table in the system.
Row-level security
Every table forces row-level security. Each row is checked against the member making the request, and every other member’s rows stay out of reach.
Without it: privacy would depend on every line of code remembering to filter by owner.
Refusals tested on every change
Tests act as one member and ask for another’s workspace, accounts, purchases and tracks, against the real database roles. If anything comes back, the checks fail.
Without it: a refusal that held last month could quietly stop holding.
A written list of who reaches what
What a member may reach is written down, table by table. The checks compare the live database with that list and fail on any difference, including a new table nobody listed.
Without it: a new table could open to every member without anyone noticing.
02
Consent
Built for what you enter by hand. Consent for each connected source is in development.
Read before anything is recorded
You read who stores your information, what is collected, how long it is kept and how to request deletion, and agree to that version, before anything is recorded.
Without it: your information would be kept on terms you never saw.
Consent per sourceComing
Each connected source will ask for its own consent before its first read, and one action will withdraw it.
Without it: agreeing once would cover sources you never chose.
03
Provenance
Built. Every figure carries where it came from, and when.
Source and as-of date on every figure
Every figure names its source, such as 2 manually entered accounts, and the day it was true, on the page rather than behind a hover.
Without it: a figure no one could check.
Gaps stay gaps
A blank balance shows as not provided, never as zero, and a total that needs it is withheld and names what is missing.
Without it: a missing balance would count as nothing, and the total would look complete.
04
Payments
Built. Access follows Stripe’s confirmation, and nothing else.
Stripe’s confirmation, and nothing else
Access is added only when Stripe confirms the payment to GOBYN directly. Unsigned or wrongly signed messages change nothing, and reaching a success page is never taken as proof.
Without it: anyone who found the success page could give themselves access.
Replays change nothing
Each confirmation is recorded in the same step as its effect, so a repeat of it finds the record and stops.
Without it: one payment could grant access twice.
Doubt grants nothing
Declined, partial and unmatched payments grant no access. They go to a queue for staff to resolve.
Without it: a payment problem would become access nobody paid for.
05
Boundary
In development. Research will stay outside the platform.
Nothing shared with researchComing
GOBYN’s private research engine will share no repository, database, credential or identity with the platform.
Without it: a fault in research tooling could reach members’ records.
06
Evidence
In development. A record of what happened that cannot be rewritten.
An append-only audit trailComing
Changes will be written to an audit trail that can only be added to, kept outside every path an admin can edit.
Without it: the people a record describes could also rewrite it.
07
Recoverability
In development. Undoing things has to work, not just exist.
RevocationComing
Withdrawing consent for a source will stop its reads, exports and sends at once.
Without it: a source you had stopped would keep reading.
Deletion and exportComing
Asking for your information to be deleted, or for a copy to take with you, will work from start to finish.
Without it: a deletion request could remove less than it says.
RollbackComing
A change that goes wrong will be reversible to a known good point.
Without it: one bad change would be permanent.
One request, top to bottom
Follow one request
all the way down.
Another member asks for Bola’s savings account, using its id. Isolation is proven by a query that fails, not by the name of a policy, so here is that query, step by step.
Another member, signed inShow me account 4b1e…9a20, and set its balance to $1.00.
01 · The request
The account id in the request belongs to Bola, not to the member asking. GOBYN treats an id sent from a browser as a claim to check, never as permission.
02 · Sign-in
Who is asking is taken from the verified sign-in, never from the request. The database is told that member’s id for this request alone, so it cannot carry over into anyone else’s.
03 · Database role
The query runs as a least-privilege role, not as an administrator. It may use the accounts table, because members keep their accounts there. Tables holding sessions, payment events and settings refuse it: “permission denied”.
04 · Row-level security
The accounts table checks every row against the member named for this request. Bola’s account belongs to someone else, so for this query it is not there.
05 · The answer
The read returns no rows, the same as for an id that matches nothing. The new balance matches no row either, so nothing changes, and the reply reads “This account no longer exists.”
06 · The proof
These same requests run as tests on every change to GOBYN, against the real database roles and policies. If any of them gets something back, the checks fail.
07 · Back at the surface
Bola’s savings read exactly what she entered. Nothing in her record was shown, changed or confirmed to exist.
Same words,
different mechanics.
“Only you can see your data” can be a promise or a mechanism. The difference is where it is enforced, and whether anything checks that it still is.
| Situation | A promise in a policy | A refusal at the database |
|---|---|---|
| Another member asks for your record | The application is expected to leave it out. | The database returns no rows. The rule belongs to the table, not to the code that asks. |
| A bug forgets to filter by owner | Everyone’s rows come back. | Row-level security still applies, so only the asker’s rows come back. |
| Nobody is named on the request | It depends on what the code does by default. | Nothing comes back, rather than everything. |
| Someone forges an id | The id is trusted if a check was missed. | A change aimed at another member’s row matches nothing and changes nothing. |
| A new table is added | Covered by the policy, on paper. | The checks fail until someone decides, in review, what members may reach in it. |
| How you know it still holds | A sentence in a document. | A request for another member’s record, made on every change, that must come back empty. |
Good
questions.
Can another member see my record?
No. Your accounts and figures sit in your Personal workspace, and the database refuses every other member’s requests for them.
What does “enforced by the database” mean?
The rule that a member sees only their own rows is part of each table, through row-level security, and member requests run as a role that can reach only what a member needs. Even a query that forgot to filter by owner would get back only the asker’s rows.
How do you know it still works?
On every change to GOBYN, tests act as one member and ask for another member’s workspace, accounts, purchases and tracks, against the real database. If anything comes back, the checks fail.
Do I give GOBYN my card details?
No. You enter them on Stripe’s hosted checkout page. GOBYN adds your access only when Stripe confirms the payment to GOBYN directly.
What happens if a payment goes wrong?
Nothing is granted. Declined, partial and unmatched payments go to a queue for staff, and a confirmation that arrives twice changes nothing the second time.
How does consent work?
Before you record anything, you read who stores it, what is collected, how long it is kept and how to request deletion, and agree. Connected sources, when they arrive, will each ask for their own consent, withdrawn in one action that stops reads, exports and sends.
What is still being built?
The boundary that keeps the private research engine apart from the platform, an append-only audit trail outside admin edit paths, consent for each connected source, and revocation, deletion, export and rollback that work from start to finish. Each is marked on this page.